Emergency Funding or Entrenched Dependency?
The Politics of Aid in Haiti
On March 1st, the United States Government began disbursing $125 million into the UN’s Regional Pooled Fund for Haiti. As of now, the money will target 26 “priority” communes in the West, Central, and Artibonite departments, 19 of which the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has identified as having intersectoral severity levels 4 (Extreme) and 5 (Catastrophic).
Three consortia of groups will receive funding; the majority will go to UN agencies, including the World Food Program (WFP), the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The other consortia include major international organizations like Save the Children, Plan International, Mercy Corps, Solidarite International, ACTED, and others. Critically, this funding has a timeline: project implementation must not exceed six months and end on August 31st, 2026.
While it may seem that these funds offer a much-needed lifeline to communities facing extreme hardship, the structure and timeline of this funding risk both prolonging the crisis and undermining Haiti’s long-term ability to recover from it. And though many of the recipient organizations recognize this reality and are pushing to change the terms of the funding, they are likely to accept the money no matter the final decision.
REPEATING THE MISTAKES OF THE PAST
The specific terms for these funds are ever-shifting, but the overall strategy is clear–the United States Government will fund a fleet of international organizations to implement externally-driven initiatives in some of the most vulnerable and insecure areas of Haiti.
Thirty percent of the money is expected to be used for cash transfers–distributing money to individuals and families identified as particularly vulnerable or “in-need” for them to spend as they see fit. While this can help to bolster families’ ability to provide for themselves in the short-term, it can also be easily compromised in conflict-affected areas. Cash transfers will likely be done in the areas identified as most “in need”–metropolitan Port-au-Prince, Artibonite, and others–the same areas that are almost entirely controlled by gangs. Gang members have been known to divert distributions by stealing or extorting the money from recipients by forcibly taking sim cards, falsifying cell numbers, etc., bolstering their operations and failing to make any positive impact on the intended recipients. When the cash transfers are done by international organizations with few relationships in communities and little understanding of the context and dynamics at play, this risk is compounded.
INGO-driven cash transfers are just one example of how these funds can–and likely will–be used irresponsibly. The rest of the funds will be used to supplement existing and ongoing INGO-led interventions in Haiti or for projects within specific sectors, such as WASH (water, sanitation, and hygiene). From decades of working in Haiti, the members of our Coalition have seen time and time again how foreign-, donor-led projects like these undermine local leadership, create competition for limited resources, decimate domestic industry, funnel resources into the gangs, and break down the fabric of Haitian society. The projects undertaken with these funds will likely exacerbate this long-term damage, violating the core mandate of humanitarian intervention–to do no harm.
A POLITICAL UPSIDE
The six-month timeline for implementing projects with these funds presents a serious logistical challenge, even with short-term, band-aid projects like cash transfers. So why the rush? It is not unreasonable to point to the potential for significant benefit for all parties involved. For one, the six-month deadline falls on August 31st, just one day after the first round of general elections in Haiti since 2016. The next six months will be politically charged as candidates jockey for public favor and votes–and influencing the delivery of $125 million in aid can and will be significant leverage for those in the running.
In the US, the current administration is locked in a legal battle as they attempt to revoke Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Haitians. Through TPS, more than 300,000 Haitians are allowed to live and work legally in the United States without fear of deportation due to the instability of their home country, a status that has been in place for Haitians since the 2010 earthquake. TPS for Haiti was slated to expire on February 3rd, but a last-minute stay from a federal judge has kept the program in place for now as litigation continues. To justify repealing TPS, the administration has to prove that Haiti is stable and safe enough for Haitians in the US to return–an aim certainly helped by the appearance that the US government is investing in the well-being of the country.
The members of the recipient consortia, too, benefit from this arrangement. After the collapse of the US Agency for International Development and the US’s withdrawal from a large number of financial commitments to multilateral institutions, including the United Nations, many of these agencies and INGOs are on little more than life support. They need this funding to stay operational, and they’ll take it–no matter the stipulations that come with it.
A win-win-win for everyone except Haitian communities.
THE ALTERNATIVE
Haitian local and national organizations are conspicuously missing from this plan–but it’s not too late for them to be incorporated. The US government’s pre-2025 commitment to localization may be a thing of the past, but the members of the recipient consortia still have active commitments to the Grand Bargain, the Charter for Change, and the Pledge for Change.
Haitian organizations should be the recipients of this funding. They are the experts in the problems that plague their communities and the solutions that can actually make a difference. They operate faster, more effectively, and more sustainably than bureaucratic international institutions, and they know how to work through and around Haiti’s current circumstances.
This funding can be deployed in two ways. The recipient organizations can prioritize their self-interest, ignoring their commitments to shift funding and power to local organizations and wading into a complex environment with the same projects we’ve seen fail time and time again. Or, they could tap into Haiti’s existing network of effective, local organizations to deploy this funding and make a positive impact on Haiti and Haitian lives in the short-, medium-, and long-term.
As funders of Haitian-led development, we call on the recipient consortia to sub-grant these funds to locally rooted, Haitian-led organizations, like those we have already vetted and supported for years.
About the Funders Coalition for Haitian-led Development (FCHLD)
FCHLD is an informal, regular gathering of funders, the goal of which is to increase coordination and cooperation among those funding Haitian-led aid and development. This article was compiled by Ayiti Community Trust, Haiti Community Foundation-Espwa, and Roots of Development with input and collaboration from the Coalition. FCHLD has ten members, including: Ansara Family Fund, Ayiti Community Trust, Dalton Foundation, Haiti Community Foundation-ESPWA, Haiti Development Institute, Network of Engaged International Donors, and Roots of Development.